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Abstract—Blockchain has the potential to revolutionize
the way we store, use, and process data. Information on
most blockchains can be viewed by every node hosting the
blockchain, which means that most blockchains cannot handle
private data. Decentralized databases exist that guarantee
privacy by encrypting user data with the user’s private key,
but this prevents easy data sharing. However, in many real
world applications, from student data to medical records, it
is desirable that user data is anonymously searchable. In this
paper we present a novel system that gives users ownership
over their data while at the same time enabling them to make
their data searchable within previously agreed upon limits. Our
system implements a strong notion of ownership using a self-
sovereign identity system and a weak notion of ownership using
multiple centralized databases together with a blockchain and
a tumbling process. We discuss applications of our methods to
university’s student records and medical data.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines owner-
ship and private property as “a kind of system that allocates
particular objects [...] to particular individuals to use and
manage as they please, to the exclusion of others [...] and
to the exclusion also of any detailed control by society.”
[1]. The key word here is exclusion. In the context of data,
ownership implies that the owner of a datum can exclude
others from access or use.
The web 2.0 was built on the premise of user-generated
data [2]. However, under the current paradigm, users have
no ownership of the data they create. To the contrary, the
business model of companies like Google, Facebook, and
Twitter is to offer free services financed by selling user data
to advertisers and other third parties.
In this paper, we describe a system which implements
the notion of data ownership using a decentralized database,
multiple centralized databases administered by different en-
tities and a public blockchain as a link between them. Our
system allows data creators to store de-identified user data,
such as student records or medical data, in a decentralized
database. Identifying information is stored in several cen-
tralized databases, that allow updating of data without ap-
pending it, managed by custodians. Alternatively, identifying
information can be stored decentralized using self-sovereign
identity (SSI) system. User data is linked to identifying
information using smart contracts on a blockchain. Crucially,
users obtain ownership of their data by scrambling the
link between user data and identifying information on the
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blockchain. This way, a user can exclude others from using
her personal information by preventing them from linking
anonymous user data with identifying information.
The immutable append-only nature of blockchains makes
them fundamentally different from traditional databases
where a client can also perform a delete function in addition
to the create, read, and update function that a blockchain
performs as well [3].
There are three major drawbacks when using a blockchain.
First, blockchains are auditable by design, which is in stark
contrast to the need for greater privacy highlighted in the re-
cent NSA surveillance1 and Cambridge Analytica2 scandals.
Second, blockchains do not scale well [4]. Some estimate that
about 90% of the world’s data was generated in the last few
years alone.3 Thus, blockchains are not a viable alternative
for most real-world applications. And third, searching on a
blockchain is difficult. While public blockchains are fully
auditable, searching by the value of a transaction rather than
the address (i.e. the key at which the transaction can be found
on the blockchain) is cumbersome. It is easy to get a list of
all transactions recorded on the blockchain, but finding all
transactions of a certain size usually requires querying the
blockchain, which is slow and expensive.
One solution to the privacy challenges outlined above is
self-sovereign identity [5], [6]. A number of projects aim
to solve the privacy issue of blockchains by introducing
self-sovereign identity [8], [7]. These approaches have in
common that they store user’s private keys offline and thus
decentralized, usually in a mobile application that signs
and validates data e.g. for interactions with a blockchain.
Additionally, it can store any kind of private data offline
on the mobile device. Self-sovereign identity solves the
problem that private keys cannot be safely stored on a
massive centralized database since this database would then
be an extremely attractive target for attackers (as argued, for
example, in [8]).
There are two problems with self-sovereign data, though.
First, among legal scholars it is subject to debate whether
complete data ownership is a goal that lawmakers should
pursue in the first place [9]. De-identified medical data, for
example, can be a public good if it is used for research
purposes. So one could make an argument that this data
should be owned by the government, or that there should be
strict limits under which individuals can own their data. But
1See NY Times (accessed 08 July 2018).
2See The Guardian (accessed 08 July 2018).
3See BBC (accessed 08 July 2018).
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even if these legal—and in some instances, moral—issues
can be resolved, a second, technological, problem remains.
If a user encrypts her data with her private key before storing
it in a database, this data cannot be searched over. So any
query on another datum that involves relative measures will
remain incomplete. For student data it might be relevant to
know not only the mark of a student, but whether she was
one of the top 5% achiever in a given year. For medical data
the importance of relative measures is even clearer. Whether
the results of a blood test show an anomaly is by definition
a relative measure, for example.
Self-sovereign identity systems can guarantee that only
the owner of a datum can access it. But they also prevent
any use of the data by third parties, even in cases where
the owner would allow third-party access to the de-identified
data. Ideally, the data owner would be able to write a contract
that prevents the third party from copying and selling the
user data. This is not possible, however, since the third party
cannot commit to this agreement. The consequence of this
commitment issue is that users are unwilling to share their
data at all and the market breaks down. Another major issue
is the lack of adoption of self-sovereign identity systems.
While various projects exist to promote self-sovereign iden-
tities, it will require time before users adapt. Therefore, any
system that depends on self-sovereign identity adoption will
inevitably face difficulties in scaling. Our system enables a
weak notion of data ownership even without a self-sovereign
identity system.
Our privacy-preserving system for data ownership solves
both the legal and technological issues outlined above. A
custodian (e.g. a university or a hospital) creates user data
which is stored on a decentralized database. This allows other
custodians to share the same database without being able to
identify individuals and has the added advantage that the
authenticity of the data is never in question because the data
is cryptographically signed by the creator. De-identified user
data is linked to identifying data via a smart contract on the
blockchain that stores a user’s id in the identifying database.
If a user wants to claim ownership of the data, she has to
break the link between the smart contract and the identifying
database her data is stored in by either updating her id in
the identifying database but not in the smart contract, or by
moving her identifying data–and only her identifying data–
onto her self-sovereign identity system.
Several blockchain-based projects want to store private
data on the blockchain, including Medicalchain, BCDiploma,
and Aeron. However, what all these projects have in com-
mon, and what sets our system apart, is that they do not
implement data ownership, privacy, and searchability of data
at the same time. Our system achieves all three goals–
highlighted in Section II–simultaneously and we outline the
system architecture in Section III. In Section IV we discuss
two possible use cases, while Section V concludes.
II. GOALS AND LIMITATIONS
Before turning to the specification of our system, it is
useful to re-iterate the three goals our system achieves:
(i) Implement a notion of data ownership which allows
users to exclude others from using their data.
(ii) Allow third parties to compute previously agreed upon
operations on de-identified user data.
(iii) Store the user data of possibly millions of users, i.e.
operate at scale.
Our system consists of three components, a decentralized,
peer-to-peer database, multiple centralized databases which
allow for the deletion of entries, and a blockchain to link
those two components. Arguably, the biggest advantage of
our system is its simplicity. Our main goal was to achieve
a notion of data ownership while still allowing third parties
access to de-identified data under previously agreed upon
conditions.
A. Our notion of ownership
No universally accepted notion exists of what it means to
own data. Even the legal framework covering data protec-
tion varies widely across countries. In 2016 the European
Commission, for example, released a report studying data
protection and ownership across the European Union [10].
While countries like Germany confer “ownership-like rights
on a data holder”, there is “no statutory basis for the
protection of data as such, and so no property rights subsist;
data cannot be stolen, assigned, or inherited.” in the United
Kingdom. In the United States, the US Department of Health
and Human Services is responsible for guidelines on medical
data. In an article on data ownership, it highlights the
importance of data access and, following [11], states that:
“The control of information includes not just the ability
to access, create, modify, package, derive benefit from, sell
or remove data, but also the right to assign these access
privileges to others.”
These examples are not supposed to give an exhaustive
overview of the legal debate, but rather highlight the range
of opinions expressed in this debate. The main trade-off
faced by lawmakers is between data owners’ privacy and
the use of data in the creation of public goods such as
medical research. Full ownership implies that the owner can
exclude others from using the data. But in many applications,
this right to privacy needs to be carefully weighed against
the contribution to a public good. Or, as the European
Commission puts it in their report [10] “[. . .] a regime,
which incentivises stakeholders to withhold access for third
parties to their data altogether, potentially restricts the extent
of exploitation and innovation within data driven industry
sectors.”
Our approach to ownership loosely follows the economic
literature, and in particular the literature on incomplete
contracts and the notion of ownership in contract theory [12].
Here, contractual rights are either specific rights or residual
rights and ownership is the control over these residual rights.
The distinction between specific and residual rights becomes
important when two parties form a contract about the use of
an asset. To make things concrete, consider a user selling data
to a company. Because data can be copied at almost no cost
and with only very limited copyright protection (an exception
is the EU General Data Protection Regulation [13]), the user
has almost no control over what happens with her data once
she sold them–she cannot exclude others from using her data
and has thus no ownership over them. She also has no control
over the residual rights, i.e. all rights to the data that are not
specified in the original sales contract.
We say a user owns her data if she can prevent others
from associating her user data with identifying information.
While in some instances this definition is much weaker than
the definitions discussed above, in other instances the two
are equivalent. Specifically, when the user data is valuable
only in conjunction with identifying information the ability
to prevent others from associating user data and identifying
information is equivalent to the ability to exclude others from
using the data. For the situations we are concerned with,
accessing student or medical data, our notion of ownership
is sufficiently strong. In the case of student data, a potential
employer, for example, will not be interested in the marks of
an anonymous student, but rather in hiring a specific student.
B. Limitations of our system
We built our system with a very specific goal in mind:
to implement the notion of ownership for sensitive personal
data described in II-A. Our notion of ownership is a rel-
atively weak one, though, since our system only prevents
the mapping from de-identified user data from identifying
information. In some instances it might be possible to
reconstruct a user’s identity from her user data [14], [15].
The likelihood of this increases the more user specific data
is stored in the same distributed database [15]. However, the
nodes themselves are run by the custodians, which requires
a minimum level of trust (in the custodians), so our system
is not trustless. The API endpoints are accessible only to
approved third parties, which limits the potential for misuse.
Consequently, our system works well when user data
cannot be used to substitute the identifying information. For
the two use cases we have in mind, student data and medical
records, this is likely to be the case. Student data is valuable,
for example, to possible employers and companies offering
bursaries and loans. But most of its value comes from the
combination with identifying information since employers
ultimately want to contact the student. Similarly, in the
medical field most of the value of patient data comes when
e.g. insurance companies knows who the patient is.
The second limitation of our system is the use of multiple
centralized databases which allow for the deletion of data.
Few distributed databases exist that provide that feature and
they are not well developed yet4. This concept is in stark
contrast to the conventional blockchain ideology where the
blockchain acts as a distributed ledger that keeps track of
the entire history of all transactions, i.e. is append only. We
4TiesDB is still in alpha mode and supposed to be a public platform
where data storage is paid for. However, our legal requirements ask for a
permissioned distributed database that is run by a consortium of custodians
without additional costs. The same holds for Bluezelle. An alteration of both
technology’s code basis may be possible to run it as a private consortium,
similar to how Quorum was forked from Ethereum as a private consortium.
explicitly allow for the possibility of self-sovereign identity
data hosted by users through the use of an according system.
But especially during a transitional period there will be users
who do not want to use a self-sovereign identity system and
rather prefer a centralized point of access to their identity
data. This is very similar to how cryptocurrency exchanges
like coinbase store their users’ private keys.
We achieve security and transparency through a dedicated
protocol which includes making the source code of our
system open source. The single point of failure where users’
identifying data is stored in centralized databases is still
not ideal. However, as self-sovereign identity becomes more
widely adopted, the need for this single point of failure
will disappear and over time the system will become fully
decentralized.
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
Our system consists of three principal components: (i)
a decentralized and distributed database for user data; (ii)
a number of centralized CRUD databases for identifying
information; and (iii) a blockchain storing information how
the two are linked. In the long run we expect the identifying
information to be stored on an open self-sovereign identity
system which would establish a strong notion of ownership.
Until then, our system implements a weak notion of own-
ership by using a CRUD database together with a tumbling
mechanism outlined below.
The decentralized and distributed record database stores
user data. The database is hosted by a group of custodians
(e.g. a university or a medical professional, depending on the
application). Custodians have write access to this database
and can query it through a third party interface. Identifying
information about the data owners is stored only in the
identifying databases or, prospectively, in a self-sovereign
identity system. The link between user data and identifying
information is stored in a smart contract on a blockchain
owned and controlled by the data owner. The data owner
can break the link by tumbling the entry in the coorsponding
identifying database: generate a new random id for her
personal information in the identifying database, update the
personal information, but not update the id stored in the smart
contract. Then, the link between user data and identifying
information is broken and from this moment forward her user
data can no longer be matched with identifying information,
which is how the data owner can exclude third parties from
knowing about her identity.
The alternative is that the data owner uses a self-sovereign
identity system, which ensures that every query to her
identifying information has to be approved. Third parties can
use a web interface to query user data with the permission of
the custodian. The custodian decides which queries he allows
on the user data through the API endpoints of the distributed
user database. So only queries approved by the custodian can
be executed, which is how the custodian keeps full control
over the data he creates. User data is tamper proof, since
only custodians have write access, while data owners and
third parties only have read access.
The system is shown in Figure 1 and each component is
explained in greater detail below. The tumbling process and
CRUD databases for identifying information ensure at least
a weak notion of ownership while data owners transition to
a self-sovereign identity.5
A. Storing user data using a decentralized and distributed
database
Our system follows a clear separation of concerns. User
data is stored in a decentralized and distributed database.
This database is the core data storage, holding all data of
interest except identifying information. Ideally, this decen-
tralized database is hosted by the custodians of the user data.
These custodians form a consortium because they have a
shared interest in the integrity of the user data. In the case
of student data, universities are the custodians of the data
and thus ideally suited to host the user database. Note that
the requirements in terms of load, disk space, and bandwidth
to operate the decentralized database increase in the number
of members of the consortium and thus the number of users
on the system. However, since the number of users is bound
by the number of students, which is not too large, these
requirements are moderate.
By storing the address of the corresponding smart contract
with each datum, identification of user data is only possible if
it is permissioned by the data owner (i.e. if the smart contract
contains the link to the identifying information). User data
can be created by the custodians only which ensures the
integrity of the data at all times.
It is important to note that user data is not encrypted in the
decentralized database, but stored in plain text. This storage
concept allows for queryability and searchability without
revealing personal information. Two aspects of our setup
alleviate potential privacy concerns with storing user data
unencrypted. First, we carefully split user data and identify-
ing information, so that no personal information (e.g. what
marks a specific student has, or which medications a specific
patient receives) can ever be revealed. And second, we only
allow access to this data through an API which implements
a notion of role based access control. The remaining concern
is that database administrators at one of the custodians could
potentially access the raw data. This is true, but the only data
they would have access to is de-identified information which
has little value without the identifying information.
B. Storing identifying information in centralized CRUD
databases
One of the biggest problems of self-sovereign identity
systems is user adoption. For many users, these systems are
still too difficult to use and as a result, take-up is slow. The
guiding principle of our system is to provide a notion of
ownership to all users, including those who do not want
to use a self-sovereign identity system. Therefore, initially,
5Especially in an emerging markets context this component of the system
is important, as there are students who do not have their own cell phones
and therefore could not use a self-sovereign identity system.
all identifying information is stored in centralized CRUD
databases, one hosted by each custodian.
A datum is hashed on the individual level, including a
time stamp and a nonce, to create a unique id. To increase
anonymity by obscurity, a certain percentage of fake data
entries is created. Depending on the degree of ownership
the user wants to enforce, her entry’s id is either updated
in a smart contract on the blockchain owned by the user, or
removed alltogether. Applying the weak form of ownership
will update the nonce, thereby creating a completely different
id hash, which is not updated in the smart contract, hence
making it impossible to identify the user and rendering the
user data worthless.
To decrease the chance of mapping this user to her data,
a number of fake data entries’ ids are also updated. To
enhance the security of the system, user data and identifying
information will be run on two physically different systems
by the custodian. Alternatively, the identifying information
databases can be hosted by multiple third parties. Security is
further improved by disclosing all source code that interacts
with the databases and by hiring an independent security
audit company to check the source code for possible vulner-
abilities.
The data is created by custodians only. However, the data
owner is allowed to update the id or move the entry to her
self-sovereign identity management system, thereby claiming
ownership of the data.
C. Linking user data and identifying information using the
blockchain
To link identifying information to user data and to en-
sure ownership and privacy, we use blockchain technol-
ogy. Individual-specific smart contracts store the id of the
database entry containing the identifying information, i.e.
the hash of that information plus nonce, and the link to
the specific identifying database API endpoint that includes
that datum. Furthermore, they include a flag that determines
whether a third party is allowed to access their personal
information. On creation, these smart contracts will be owned
by the data creators, i.e. the custodians. Individuals are
encouraged to claim ownership of their data and update
their data id frequently to increase security. If an individual
decides to revoke access to her data, she can update her id
in the identifying database but not update it in the smart
contract.
To facilitate the search of smart contracts by a user’s
identifying id, one query contract is deployed that stores a
mapping of id to smart contract. The value is set to 0 if the
user claims ownership.
D. The self-sovereign identity system
To facilitate data ownership, we make use of an self-
sovereign identity system. If a user decides to claim owner-
ship of her data, she can choose between two different forms–
weak and strong ownership. Weak ownership will update
the user’s id in the identifying database without updating
it on the blockchain. Strong ownership will delete the user’s
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Fig. 1. System architecture. A decentralized record database (left) stores user data. An entry in this database is linked with an entry in an identifying
database (center right) or a self-sovereign identity stored on a mobile phone (right) through a smart contract hosted on a blockchain (center). Custodians
host the decentralized record database and a identifying database and create data entries. Data owners control the smart contract and can break the link
between user data and identifying information. Third parties can use a web interface to query user data with the permission of the custodian. Third parties
can also query matching identifying information for a user datum, but only with the permission of the data owner.
entry from the identifying database and store it on the user’s
mobile device. In both cases, the user will become the owner
of the smart contract on the blockchain. The process is made
accessible through the help of an self-sovereign identity
system that manages the user’s key pair and the data storage,
if requested. Obviously, strong ownership is the more desired
form of ownership because the user can decide on a case-
to-case basis whether she wants to reveal her personal data.
Additionally, there is no single point of failure in form of a
centralized identifying database anymore.
E. The first implementation
We will briefly focus on the actual technology we used
to implement the first prototype of the system as it has
been described above. The decentralized and distributed
database that stores user data is a BigchainDB, the cen-
tralized databases, storing identifying information, are Mon-
goDBs, and the blockchain is a private Ethereum node. Self-
sovereign identitiy is facilitated by uPort. The BigchainDB,
MongoDBs and the Ethereum blockchain are wrapped in
APIs that deal authentication and authorization of the system.
These APIs can be audited due to their open-source nature.
IV. USE CASES
There are numerous applications for the architecture we
introduced, including the storage of academic and medical
records. To emphasize the possibilities and advantages our
system offers and to explain its functionalities in greater
detail, this sections provides a detailed discussion of two
use cases. Figure 1 serves as a visual guide.
A. Academic Records
In the application of academic records, the custodians are
the universities–or more precisely university administrators
and staff–and the data owner is a student. Until today, all
student data is stored in a large centralized database at the
university, shielded from the outside. There is no possibility
for students or third parties to interact with it and therefore
the value of the data remains underutilized. In our system, as
long as the student has not claimed ownership of her personal
data, it will also be stored in a university-hosted centralized
CRUD database, the entry being created on registration.
However, academic records like marks or degree descrip-
tions are stored in a distributed and decentralized database.
Furthermore, the university administrator will deploy a smart
contract to the blockchain containing the student’s entry id in
the identifying database on registration as well as the url to
the database endpoint, linking academic records and personal
information.
After completion of the first assignment (note that it does
not have to be the final course mark but can also be a com-
ponent of the course), the lecturer or departmental secretary
will upload the marks to the consortium of decentralized
database nodes, which are run by the universities. A mark
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Fig. 2. Data Structure. The identifying databases (right) are hosted by the custodians and hold personal information of individuals in single json blob
entries, characterized by a unique id. These are linked to user data via smart contracts (center) on the blockchain (one per user). These smart contracts
store a url to an identifying database API endpoint as well as the id of the entries holding the personal information in the identifying database. A smart
contract is uniquely identifiable by its address. The decentralized and distributed record database (left) also holds entries in the form of json blobs. They
contain a link to the identifying smart contract on the blockchain, as well as appendable and immutable data. Appendable data is the record itself such
that it can be updated. Immutable are any links to other data entries, include the pointer to the smart contract.
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Fig. 3. Notion of Ownership. Weak notion of ownership (top) is obtained by scrambling the link between the smart contract on the blockchain (left) and
the identifying database holding the personal information (right). This is done by updating the data entry’s id in the identifying database without updating
it in the smart contract. Strong notion of ownership (bottom) can be obtained with a self-sovereign identity system. Personal information is transfered
from the identifying database to the data vault on the mobile phone and deleted from the identifying database. The smart contract is updated to link to the
self-sovereign identity, usually a blockchain address. Now, the system will communicate directly with the data owner’s phone.
entry includes a link to the course description and the degree
description, both are entries in the decentralized database,
as well as a link to the student’s smart contract on the
blockchain. There is no identifying information stored be-
cause they can be retrieved by looking up the student’s smart
contract, collecting the id for the identifying database, and
finding the relevant information in said database. It is worth
emphasizing that only university staff will be permissioned
to upload data to the decentralized and distributed database,
which is possible because due to our restrictive APIs.
Students are encouraged to claim ownership of their
personal data. In the weak form of ownership, it will be
as simple as clicking a button in the password protected
section to ensure authority. This will generate a QR code
the student has to scan with her mobile device and thereby
sign into the system with her cryptographic identity. This
identity, an address on the blockchain, will become the
new owner of the smart contract holding the id of the
corresponding entry in the identifying database. Furthermore,
the student has the power to exclude anybody from retrieving
her personal information by updating the id in the identifying
database but not updating it in her smart contract. She can
grant read-permission by revealing her new id to requesting
third parties. This can be revoked by updating the id again.
Universities will most likely not allow the strong notion of
ownership, therefore it will be discussed in Section IV-B.
Third parties in the use case of an academic record storage
system are mainly employers and bursary donors but it is not
limited to these two groups. Of course, they have to register
with the platform first. There are two possible scenarios how
they would want to search the data. They either want to
search for a variety of students that match certain criteria or
they want to check on the progress of one particular student
of interest.
In the first case, they send a search request to the de-
centralized database that queries the data to find matching
candidates. Once those have been identified, it will return
a list of possible candidates which can not be identified
but are anonymized by their smart contract address. The
query will further be processed by calling the smart contracts
and asking for the students’ id in the identifying database
and the URL of the database it is stored in. If the student
has claimed ownership of the data already, she will be
notified and has to decide whether she wants to share her
personal information with this particular third party. If she
has not claimed ownership yet, the algorithm will look for
the id in the identifying database and retrieve the personal
information.
The second scenario will be relevant for a bursary donor
that wants to check the progress of a particular student she is
supporting. If this student has claimed ownership, the donor
will have to contact her to request the smart contract address
which is used to reverse look-up the academic records. If the
student has not claimed ownership yet, the donor can search
the identifying database of the corresponding university to
find the entry id, which is then used to retrieve the smart
contract address by means of a search contract. This search
contract stores a mapping from id to smart contract address.
Again, the address is the query string to find the relevant
data in the decentralized and distributed database.
The system comes with several advantages over the current
system. Academic data can be utilized in various beneficial
ways. The most obvious one is the match making of students
to potential employers or bursary donors from the explana-
tion above. However, the granular data can also be analyzed
to send students personal nudges–without knowing who they
are–to increase their performance in an upcoming test. If
the student has revealed her identity, lecturers and course
conveners can also reach out to students at risk of failing
a course or dropping out of a degree and support them as
best as possible. And even if the student does not reveal her
identity, lecturers can contact her anonymously by sending
a message via the platform.
B. Medical records
The advantage of storing medical data in a system like the
proposed one is obvious. All data is stored in one system,
accessible from everywhere in case of an emergency. Fur-
thermore, medical research could be conducted on the most
accurate data set there is without revealing any identifying
information–an important aspect in some jurisdictions.
Again, the record database is a distributed, decentralized
database, that could be run by any custodian–physician,
clinic, or hospital–that has the ressources to do so. Re-
alistically, these are larger entities that are storing large
amounts of data on their inhouse databases at the moment
and have the ressources to reallocate. These medical records
include diagnoses, test results, treatment plans, pharmaceu-
tical prescriptions, among others. However, they do not
contain personal information but only the address of the
smart contract representing the individual on the blockchain.
In contrast to the academic records where a student is only
registered at one university, patients visit multiple physicians,
so there is no possibility to migrate all data concerning one
patient at once. Ideally, patients can be identified by their
medical insurance number, making sure that every person
is only represented by one smart contract and by one entry
in the identifying database. However, they may also be the
need for a central organization that handles the onboarding
of patients onto the system.
Claiming ownership of the data could be accomplished as
explained in the example above. Patients log into their per-
sonal dashboard, click on a button, and identify themselves
using a mobile phone. The address sending that request is
made the new owner of the smart contract and now has the
right to update the id of their entry in the identifying database
but not in the smart contract, thereby revoking access to their
personal data and claiming ownership.
Since the centralized databases of identifying information
are the most vulnerable link in this architecture, the patient
can also decide to obtain strong ownership of her data.
Instead of updating the id of her entry in the identifying
database, she can move that data into the data vault of her
open identity system app, deleting the entry in the identifying
database altogether. The blockchain smart contract is updated
by assigning the patient’s address to the id pointer. This
enables the patient to decide on a case-by-case basis whether
she wants to share her personal information or not. Every
time somebody requests them, she is notified via the app
on her phone. In reverse, when the patient visits a doctor,
she can reveal her smart contract address and the doctor has
access to all medical records corresponding to her. Since a
physician is a custodian in the system, she will also have the
right to append this medical record.
V. CONCLUSION
Currently, the concept of strong data ownership is dis-
cussed, but not implemented for university- or medical data.
Once a datum has been shared, there is no possibility to pre-
vent the counterpart from copying and sharing or selling it.
Consequently, very personal information like student marks
or medical records are stored in centralized databases, hidden
away from the public and therefore not ideally exploited to
improve individuals’ lives.
We introduce a system that restores a weak notion of data
ownership by leveraging new blockchain technologies like
decentralized and distributed ledgers and databases. Data
ownership is defined as providing the individual with the
possibility to grant and revoke access to her identifying in-
formation, which can be used to provide her with tailor-made
services. De-identified records are stored in a decentralized
and distributed database such that they can be queried by
permitted users. Access control is enforced via restrictive
APIs and a user interface. Identifying information, and only
those, are stored in several centralized databases, hosted by
custodians. The data is protected by the same access control
system as the distributed database. Individual-specific smart
contracts on a distributed ledger serve as the link between
those two types of databases. They store the URL to the
identifying database the record is stored in as well as its
id. Decentralized and distributed database will use the smart
contracts’ address as identifier, therefore de-identifying the
data.
When claiming data ownership, the individual-specific
smart contract is signed over to the user. This user now
has the ability to prevent others from identifying her by
updating the id of her record in the identifying database
without updating it in the smart contract. Moreover, she
can achieve strong ownership of her data by transferring it
from the identifying database to a data vault on her phone
using a sovereign-identity service. The smart contract will be
updated to point to that vault. This allows the user to decide
whether she wants to reveal her identifying information or
not on a case-by-case basis.
The current system is not without drawbacks. The weakest
spot is the identifying databases that are hosted by custo-
dians. They are not byzantine-fault tolerant and could be
easily tampered with. Whenever there is a decentralized
and distributed CRUD database available that fulfills the
necessary privacy requirements, it can be considered as a
substitute. This is left for future iterations of the system.
The architecture we introduce allows for the possibility
to draw valuable insights from de-identified data that would
otherwise not be accessible to the public. In the use case of
academic records, it can be utilized to encourage students to
keep up their good work since a national or even international
comparison to other students is possible. Furthermore, it can
help to find the perfect bursary donor or future employer. If
medical records where stored in the above introduced manor,
they were accessible everywhere in the world if there was
an emergency–no request to the local physician required.
Additionally, it will be the most complete medical database
available to researches, allowing them to draw live-changing
conclusions.
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